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In conveying experiences of meditation, the question of what exceeds or should resist description has been a 
recurrent topic of commentary in a wide array of literature—including religious doctrine, meditation 
guides (secular and religious), and contextual accounts written by historians and social scientists. Yet, to 
date, this question has not significantly informed neuroscientific studies on the effects of meditation on 
brain and behaviour, in large part—but not wholly—because of the disregard for first-person accounts of 
experience that still characterizes neuroscience in general. By juxtaposing perspectives from non-
neuroscientific accounts on the tensions and questions raised by what is and is not expressed or 
expressible in words, this article paves the way for a new set of possibilities in experimental contemplative 
neuroscience.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Attempts scientifically to demonstrate the effects of meditation on brain and behaviour have 
been undertaken for decades (see Andresen, 2000), but in recent years the literature on this topic 
has burgeoned. The neuroscientific study of meditative practices is now part of a field known as 
‘contemplative neuroscience’. Particular attention in this field has been paid to meditation 
associated with Buddhist traditions and with secular Buddhist-inspired practices, such as 
‘mindfulness’. Attempts to assess the state of research have noted that there is evidence that 
meditation changes behaviour, brain activity and even brain structure, but also that there are 
methodological challenges associated with documenting meditation and its effects in 
experimental design conditions (Chen et al., 2012; Tang et al., 2015). Among these is the 
challenge of how to relate to practitioners’ accounts of their lived experiences during meditation 
(hereafter referred to as ‘meditative experiences’). 
 
In this article we argue that the recognition of concerns associated with putting experience into 
words can enable further possibilities for neuroscientific research. Outside the neuroscientific 
literature, the question of what escapes, exceeds or resists description has been a recurring topic 
of commentary—both in relation to meditation, and more generally (Franke, 2007). Indeed, in 
doctrine and philosophical analysis, in guides on meditation, in autobiographical accounts, and in 
sociological and anthropological studies, cautions regarding recounting experience are seen as 
integral to what it means to achieve a significant level of awareness and to convey one’s 
understanding of contemplative matters. Not so within contemplative neuroscience, where little 
attention has been given to what is absent from accounts of meditative experience because it 
cannot be, is difficult to, or should not be, put into words. Whereas, as we shall see, a few studies 
have gone against the grain of the primarily quantitative cognitive-behavioural paradigm, and 
have begun to use qualitative methods to inquire into the subjective experience of meditating, to 
date little (if any) consideration has been given to what aspects of this experience practitioners 
cannot or choose not to describe. 
   
This article discusses the limits of the verbal accounting of meditative experiences as a heuristic 
to challenge how to relate to practitioners’ accounts of meditative experiences in contemplative 
neuroscience. It thereby draws on works that treat what is absent not as a void or negative, but 
as an active and constitutive element of interaction (Rappert, 2015), in a bid to explore what this 
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might yield in terms of new directions for science. Paying attention to absence will enable us to 
question certain assumptions in contemplative neuroscience. It will also allow us to ask non-
conventional questions, in particular questions that turn the limits of expression into a topic of 
empirical study. These questions can, in turn, provide insights and ideas useful for experimental 
neuroscientific research. 
 
We develop our argument as follows. In section 2 we review some of the promises associated 
with the renewed round of attention to the effects of meditation on human brain and behaviour 
initiated in the late 1990s. In particular, we revisit the aspirations and agendas specified by Varela 
(1996) and Andresen & Forman (2000) for a multidisciplinary approach to the study of 
contemplative experience. We highlight how our approach, which is based on thematising what 
is absent from accounts of the experience of meditation across various domains of knowledge 
and genres of expression, relates to their aspirations and agendas. In section 3 we provide an 
overview and analysis of the tensions associated with recounting meditative experience, as 
gleaned from doctrine and practical guidance on how to meditate, first-person accounts of 
meditative journeys, and social and cultural analyses of meditation and research experimentation. 
In section 4 we turn to current and future research in contemplative neuroscience and 
distinguish different approaches in it. We show that some researchers in this field have 
emphasized the need to inquire into the subjective experience of meditation in order to interpret 
brain activity, and have started to do so. However, as we also point out, this approach has not (at 
least yet) showed much consideration for the tensions and limits (acknowledged in other 
domains) in recounting meditative experience. In section 5 we offer some preliminary ideas for 
approaches in contemplative neuroscience that would display greater sensitivity to the concerns 
outlined in section 3. These ideas will need to be refined in dialogue with experimental scientists, 
and we hope that our discussion can serve as a provocation and stimulus for such dialogue.  
 
2. The Call for a Multidisciplinary Approach to Contemplative Experience   
 
The challenges associated with the study of meditation, and the question of what sort of research 
agendas are needed in response to them, have been matters of long-standing commentary. To 
mention two sources of inspiration highly relevant to JCS, both Varela (1996) and Andresen & 
Forman (2000) had ambitious integrative research agendas for the multidisciplinary study of 
experience. Varela (1996) famously advanced the proposal for an integrative research programme 
he dubbed ‘neurophenomenology’. As the term suggests, he advocated combining quantitative 
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neuroscientific methods for the generation of third-person data about brain activity (e.g., 
neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI and PET) with phenomenological methods that would 
provide first-person data about a person’s lived experience. In Varela’s vision, 
phenomenologically trained subjects would be able to produce detailed reports about experience 
that could help scientists interpret brain activity. Vice versa, brain measurements could be used 
to refine self-observation and experiential reports in a process of ‘circulation’ and ‘mutual 
constraints’. Varela also highlighted the situated and social-practice aspects of both first- and 
third-person accounts, claiming that ‘so-called third-person, objective accounts are done by a 
community of concrete people who are embodied in their social and natural world as much as 
first-person accounts’ (op. cit., p. 340).  
 
Similarly, and even more broadly, in a Special Issue of JCS on religious and spiritual experience, 
Andresen & Forman (2000) advocated drawing on the methods and analyses of ‘the myriad 
disciplines’ contributing to the study of consciousness—such as neuroscience, physiology, 
philosophy, cognitive science, psychology, and anthropology. In their view, only a rich 
interdisciplinary approach could do justice to the complexity of religious experiences. In line with 
this outlook, they listed four main domains for the study of religious experience (op. cit., pp. 10-
12): 
1) doctrinal analysis: textual and historical examination of how divine messages are revealed 
through human language and concepts; 
2) social expression: understanding of how religious experience is an outcome of social, 
cultural, institutional and interpersonal dynamics;  
3) subjective experience: examination of the qualities of the lived character of religious 
experience;  
4) scientific research: efforts to determine the biological correlates of religious experience. 
 
Each of these domains, they argued, provides important knowledge about religious experience, 
as well as aligned methods and findings. A proper understanding of religious experience would 
bring together researchers from these different domains to examine how various doctrinal, 
social, subjective, and scientific factors influence one another. For example, researchers 
considering how cultural background, religious training and socialization ‘set up situations and 
influence our ability to have most experiences, including many mystical ones’ (p. 9) could team 
up with others examining how first-person religious experiences influence the belief system of a 
person, a group, or (in the case of particularly influential religious leaders) an entire culture. The 
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vector of influence would thus be considered in both directions, and this could be done for each 
of the four domains of inquiry.  
 
Both Varela’s call for a rigorous study of experience that combines first- and third-person data, 
and Andresen & Forman’s call to foster bi-directional influences between domains provide 
models for interdisciplinary research. The approach we adopt in this article retains these authors’ 
basic convictions that it is best to avail ourselves of insights from multiple relevant domains if we 
wish to do justice to the complexity of meditative experiences.1 The orientation we follow here is 
one of tracking a broadly defined problem through various incarnations across disciplines and 
contexts of inquiry. Our guiding question thereby is: ‘What are the limits to putting meditative 
experience into words?’. We ask what can be learned by attending to these limits as set out in 
doctrinal texts, by those guiding others in the pursuit of meditation, and in the negotiations 
between expert meditators and researchers wishing to study their practices. The shape of such an 
excursion is indicated in the following section, after which we consider its implications for 
current and future research in contemplative neuroscience.  
 
3. Indicating Limits in Accounts of Meditative Experience  
 
The aim of this section is to show that the question of how to relate to meditative experience—
and in particular to what is not, cannot or should not be said about it—has been a topic of 
commentary and debate in several disciplines and varied contexts of inquiry. Given the 
complexity of this topic, our discussion will be selective and indicative; it will point to different 
incarnations of the problem of putting meditative experience into words, as well as surface 
tensions and disagreements. Driven primarily by the intention to suggest new possibilities for 
neuroscience, we put a range of considerations on the table, and indicate these as matters of in-
situ negotiation or unsettled debate. In particular, we limit our discussion primarily to Buddhist 
meditation—and even here we provide only a selection of the relevant literature and ideas.  
 
To start, it should be noted that ‘Buddhism’ comprises many systems of thought and situated 
practices that have varied significantly over time and space, and much the same can be said about 
meditation within Buddhist traditions. The place of meditation as a source of insight and as the 
basis for Buddhist doctrine has been subject to varied treatments over time, between traditions, 
within traditions depending on one’s status, as well as across geography (e.g., Lopez Jr., 2008). 
Compounding an already complicated picture is the diverse range of translated meanings that 
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have been associated with central Buddhist terms like ‘mindfulness’ (Gethin, 2011), which have 
been taken up in a variety of more or less secular practices in North America, Europe, and 
elsewhere.   
 
Our discussion of what is not, cannot or should not be said about meditation is organized into 
three subsections:  
 
(1) ways in which doctrinal and philosophical analysis, as well as more popular treatises on 
Buddhism and guides for meditative practice, have problematized putting experience into 
words;  
(2) ways in which accounts of meditative experience vary over time and across settings; 
(3) particular patterns of accounts that have emerged in collaborations between Buddhist 
meditators and neuroscientists, and other experimental studies. 
 
3.1 Limits of accounts as a topic in doctrine and guidance for meditation practitioners  
 
Figures within Buddhism and scholarly commentators have long discussed whether meditative 
experiences (in some instances only extraordinary ones, but in other instances a much wider 
range) can and should be captured by meditators through words, and whether they can and 
should be communicated to others. In some traditions, such as Zen Buddhism, cultivating habits 
of reflecting and talking about one’s meditation experience is regarded as interfering with the 
latter, especially in the case of practices intended to produce non-conceptual, non-discursive 
‘empty’ experiences. In this tradition, monks are often required to stop reading texts about 
meditation during periods of intensive practice.2  
 
The teachings of the Buddha already refer to the potential reductions and dangers associated 
with putting experiential insights into words. In the Surangama Sutra, the Buddha warns of how 
non-enlightened minds can become engrossed in the teachings, mistaking them for awakening 
itself—in the same way that individuals can fixate on a finger that points to the moon rather than 
looking at the moon (see Ho, 2008, p. 160). Yet, in spite of these warnings, the teachings use 
language to talk about experience and its limits. The manner in which this is done has invited 
different interpretations about what can become known through words about meditative 
insights.  
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Consider for instance the debate between Tsong khapa (1357-1423) and Go rampa (1429-1489) 
as examined in Thakchoe (2007). Both were exegetes within the Tibetan Madhyamaka tradition, 
in which meditation is treated as necessary to realizing ultimate truth. Both agreed that ultimate 
truth is nondual and as such transcends the conventional subject-object distinction. They 
differed, however, in the role they attributed to conceptual thought (and thus, we can 
extrapolate, to language) in realizing ultimate truth. According to Tsong khapa, ultimate truth is 
realized through the mutual support of conceptual and non-conceptual thought; conceptual 
thought helps provide access to ultimate truth, but is not sufficient. According to Go rampa, on 
the other hand, only non-conceptual thought is capable of realizing ultimate truth, and must 
operate ‘entirely without reliance on any empirical [conventional, conceptual] epistemic 
resources’ (Thakchoe, 2007, p. 136). Conceptual thought is incompatible with the nondual nature 
of ultimate truth and thus needs to be entirely transcended. As such, whereas in Tsong khapa’s 
approach there seems to be room for language to collaborate with non-conceptual understanding 
to lead to ultimate truth, in Go rampa’s approach language can only be an obstacle. 
 
The notion that some forms of experiential insight are indescribable, and thus cannot be 
conveyed to other people, has also been a prominent theme in many contemporary Western 
scholastic analyses of Buddhism (e.g., Kasulis, 1981). Cultivating Buddhist-inspired wisdom thus 
requires appreciating the limits of words and the need to move beyond them (even if one may 
use words to call attention to this need; see Burton, 2000). The notion that some forms of 
insight are indescribable has also been a prominent theme in more popular portrayals, such as 
D.T. Suzuki’s philosophical depiction of Zen Buddhism, with its frequent and evocative 
refutations of the idea that Zen can be described (e.g., Suzuki, 1949).  
 
The insistence that ultimate truth is non-conceptual in nature relates to discussions about the 
ineffable. Within self-accounts, those experiences which language cannot capture often figure as 
peak experiences of insight (Lerner, 1977, pp. 60, 72, 100, 127). Against those positing or 
subscribing to notions of the ‘ineffable’, others have specified and listed various states or levels 
of experience, including the succession of stages that lead to higher-order insights (as in 
Goleman, 1988; Shear, 2014).3 For instance, Brown (1977) examined how texts in the Tibetan 
MuhGmudru tradition specify experiential states attained during both initial and adept levels of 
meditation. He did so in order to counter popular beliefs that meditative or mystical states (be 
they ordinary or extra-ordinary in character) are ‘ineffable’. Instead of placing them beyond 
words, Brown offered a ‘phenomenology of meditative experience’ (p. 238). However, despite 
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this stated goal, he also acknowledged that certain higher-order states discussed in MuhGmudru 
(such as the notion of ‘subtle energy’) are too complex to be described—even though they are 
the ‘starting point of meditative insight’ (p. 261) for advanced practitioners. More widely, 
different evaluations have been provided of whether central but multiply interpreted states of 
meditative experience within Buddhism, such as ‘nirvana’, can be described (Albahari, 2011). 
 
Turning from what cannot to what should not be said, in the Buddhist-inspired secular context of 
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction, through the writings of Jon Kabat-Zinn, novice meditators 
are instructed to fight the impulse to advertise their meditation practice to others: ‘If you do 
decide to start meditating, there’s no need to tell other people about it, or talk about why you are 
doing it or what it’s doing for you. In fact, there is no better way to waste your nascent energy 
and enthusiasm for practice and thwart your efforts so they will be unable to gather momentum’ 
(Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 29). Here, the issue is not ineffability but the distraction that results from 
keeping a running commentary during meditation practice—in Kabat-Zinn’s words, ‘more 
thinking’—which detracts from staying with one’s moment-to-moment awareness as it unfolds.   
 
Scholars have also pointed out that there may be pedagogical reasons why one should not talk 
about the experience of meditation. Some people may not be able to appreciate what they hear 
about meditative experience if their own contemplative progression has not prepared them 
(Herrigel, 1999, p. 23). Thus, experienced meditators are warned that they may inadvertently 
hamper the progress of relative novices when talking about higher states of consciousness, 
because such descriptions may reinforce delusional thinking, set up expectations for what 
‘should’ be experienced, and romanticize the practice of meditation (Kornfield, 2001). 
Accordingly, the decision of talking about meditative experience depends on the situation and on 
whom one is talking to.  
 
For present purposes, while the points above only offer the briefest of treatments, they illustrate 
that the communication of meditative experiences and related states of consciousness is not an 
uncontroversial activity within Buddhist texts and their interpretation, and within (Buddhist-
inspired or secular) meditation guides.  
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3.2 Accounts of meditative experience as varying over time and setting  
 
In this sub-section we review some of the considerations informing the expression of meditative 
experiences in social situations where such expression is deemed salient, and also potentially 
problematic. These considerations inform individuals’ decisions on what to say and to whom, 
and they prompt us to question what has been stated about experience. 
 
To begin, we can note that communal mores have had a bearing on decisions about what should 
be disclosed about the details of meditation practice—as is highlighted in accounts of early 
attempts to enrol Buddhist monks in scientific research relating to meditation. A case in point is 
the story of senior Tibetan monks in retreat on Bhagsu Mountain, who were approached by a 
team of scientists in 1992 (Houshmand et al., 2002; Harrington, 2008). One by one, the monks 
denied to have achieved any significant spiritual attainment, and politely declined to expand on 
their meditation practices. Given that they were recommended by the members of the Council 
for Religious and Cultural Affairs of the Tibetan government-in-exile, this outcome was very 
surprising to the scientists. They eventually learned that the monks’ reluctance stemmed from 
monastic prohibitions against extolling one’s spiritual accomplishments or comparing them with 
others’. In addition, the monks were not convinced that supporting the cause of science would 
be as important as continuing to focus on their own progress towards enlightenment.  
 
The latter is a complicated issue. Paine (2004, p. 202) tells of the Dalai Lama publicly changing 
his mind on this matter in 1979, moving from the view that engagement with scientists would be 
a distraction for senior monks, to the argument that ‘our friends to the East [the Chinese] might 
be impressed with a Western explanation of what we are doing’ (see also Harrington, 2008).4 In 
the late twentieth-century, meditation and its scientific explanation became a form of ‘soft 
power’, a way to ensure the survival of Tibetan Buddhism at a time of its repression in its 
homeland (see Whalen-Bridge 2015).5 What is and is not conveyed about the lived experience of 
meditation is thus a situated, negotiated, and to some extent dynamic, matter. 
 
This has been so in relation to face-to-face encounters too. Jordt (2007, chapter 2) draws on the 
pedagogical manual for the tradition of Satipatthana Vipassana meditation, devised in twentieth-
century Burma, to elucidate the periodic interviews that teachers were meant conduct with 
students amidst long periods of sitting and walking meditation. In the interview situation, 
students’ verbal expression of their experience of meditation is constituted interactively and 
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pedagogically. The teacher seeks to distinguish, and to train the student in distinguishing, what 
the student has authentically experienced from what he or she narrates based on conceptual 
knowledge gained by reading or hearing about the experiences of other people. The manual 
suggests a variety of follow-up questions and ‘tests’ to allow ‘[t]he experience and the idea-of-the 
experience [to be] distinguished according to the depth and exactitude of the yogi’s cultivated 
observational skills’ (Jordt, 2007, p. 73). Making this distinction requires much expertise and 
carries high stakes, as incorrect assessments about progression are treated as having karmic 
consequences for both student and teacher (Jordt, 2007, p. 70).    
 
Others have argued that the very categories of meditative experience are contextually contingent. 
As Sharf (1995; 2000) has contended, scholars and practitioners of religion refer to the 
perception of discrete and definite ‘inner’ qualitative experiences. In this, experience is treated as 
a given ‘it’ (even if it may be difficult to put into words). One of the ways Sharf criticizes such 
thinking is to marshal empirical observations in order to show that multiple ‘its’ are represented 
by the same terminology. For instance, as he argues in the cases of Vipassana meditation and 
Zen Buddhism, the meaning of the prevalent experiential categories and terms has changed over 
time and has been contested amongst adept masters, suggesting that there is no ultimate agreed 
referent. Sharf also contends that many of the labels used to refer to experience (such as Suzuki’s 
notion of ‘pure experience’) are fairly recent inventions tailored to make sense to Western 
audiences. On the other hand, Shedneck’s study of Thai meditation teachers provides grounds 
for downplaying the relevance of Sharf’s arguments. As she notes, at least some teachers of 
Theravada Buddhism in Thailand’s international meditation centers consider it both effective 
and legitimate to use secular, universalizing, therapeutic-psychological language when teaching 
meditation to foreigners (Shedneck, 2015). They argue that ‘Western psychology is a useful 
translator and stepping stone to understand deeper Buddhist concepts’ (op. cit, p. 134, n11), and 
that such translation does not affect ‘the experience of insight itself’, which is fundamentally 
beyond language in any case (p. 147). Herein, the focus is not with the extent of the 
representational correspondence between words and experience, but with how terminology 
pragmatically serves the goal of advancing the process of awakening.   
 
In sum, then, in this sub-section we have illustrated that what is and is not said about the lived 
experience of meditation intersects with concerns for tradition, authenticity, survival and truth, 
against the backdrop of ongoing changes to the communities and circumstances in which 
Buddhism is practiced. 
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3.3 Patterns of accounts in collaborations between Buddhist meditators and experimental studies 
 
Attempts scientifically to identify and study the effects of meditation raise questions of their own 
about how experiences are and should be recounted, and about the interplay between what is 
and is not put into words about meditative experience. At stake are questions about the 
compatibility between science and meditation, as well as whether meditation in itself can be 
regarded as a form of scientific method (Schmidt & Walach, 2014a).6  
 
Consider then some contrasting orientations to descriptions of meditative experience. In 
multiple book-length analyses, Austin (1998, 2006) has sought to bring together his training in 
Zen Buddhism and neurology. While making reference to William James’s ([1902] 1925) analysis 
of the ineffability of experience, as well as D.T. Suzuki’s writings regarding how words distract 
from understanding Zen, Austin ‘points the way’ towards Zen by recounting a number of his 
own personal experiences of altered states of consciousness—such as selflessness and samadhi 
(mental tranquillity) (e.g., Austin, 2006, pp. 353, 407-409, 479). He offers such first-person 
accounts in addition to reports and analyses of meditation stages and states (such as varieties of 
‘oneness’). For Austin, identifying his own altered experiential states provides a basis from which 
to circulate between third-person human neurological and physiology data, and first-person 
accounts (in this case his own; see also Austin, 2016), while still acknowledging that not all 
experiences can be rendered in words. 
 
Contrast this orientation to experience with that of another person possessing a dual identity that 
spans both science and Buddhism. The first chapter of Goleman’s (2003) popular book 
Destructive Emotions has served as an emblematic account of collaboration between experimental 
scientists and Buddhist monks (see, e.g., Ricard, 2007; Levenson et al., 2012). Goleman describes 
a battery of exceptional test results in 2000 for Matthieu Ricard, a French Buddhist monk with a 
PhD in molecular genetics. What is worthy of note for the purposes of this article is how 
Ricard’s lived experience is absent from the scientifically oriented descriptions of those 
experiments (see Rappert et al., 2016). Whereas it is said that he entered into particular meditative 
states, no description is given of the lived qualities or character of those states. Instead, terms 
like ‘compassion’ and ‘concentration’ are used as generic labels to designate discrete and definite 
states. Even in his autobiographical account of the 2000 experiments, Ricard (2007) uses generic 
labels, and at times even third-person language, to report his experience of the experiments 
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through a conventional scientific style.7 As we develop further in section 4, the citation of labels 
rather than description of experience is still prevalent in contemplative neuroscience. What the 
lack of first-person descriptions of lived experience means in the case of Ricard is that he and 
others sidestep potentially thorny questions about the relationship between Buddhist 
vocabularies for experience, and Western scientific vocabularies for neural and physiological 
measurement.8 It thus also has the effect of reducing the need to enter into debates about what 
can and cannot, should or should not, be put into words.   
 
The lack of attention to first-person descriptions also obscures the ways in which interactions 
within experimental settings may affect accounts. Elsewhere, the interaction between 
experimenters and participants has become associated with producing particular patterns of 
description. In a detailed study of the language of introspective reporting in psychological 
experiments (not related to meditation), Wooffitt & Holt (2011) showed that participants’ 
management of speech and silence indicate that they are sensitive to the requirements of the 
setting (for example, the fact that the experimenter is taking notes), act out common-sense 
understandings of the phenomenon under investigation (e.g., the speed and rhythm with which 
images would appear in their consciousness), and appreciate the obligations of a ‘proper’ 
research subject (e.g., by verbalizing that there is ‘nothing to report’ so that the researcher knows 
the subject is still attentively watching his or her experience). Self-reporting, Wooffitt & Holt 
argue, is a form of social action: the interplay of verbalizations and silences serves to coordinate 
participants and experimenters.  
 
This last point brings us back to Varela’s (1996) argument about individual experience being an 
intersubjective, rather than an entirely ‘private’ phenomenon. Wooffitt & Holt go further though 
in their orientation to language, an orientation held widely in the social sciences that can be 
labelled as a ‘discursive’ (see Edwards 1997). Here, rather than treating language as a means of 
(more or less accurately) representing experience, ‘to say something’ is treated as a way ‘to do 
something’ (Austin 1962, p. 12). In the experimental setting this means that, as managed social 
actions, descriptions should be understood as given in such kinds of interaction settings, and 
their meaning needs be understood as a form of action that helps constitute what counts as an 
experiment (and, as part of this, the roles of experimenters and participants). As a result, for 
Wooffitt & Holt, along with others that adopt a discursive approach, it is naïve to treat 
description as simply a mapping experience. In section 5 we consider proposals for future 
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research attentive to the assumptions of both representational and discursive orientations to 
language.    
 
These brief examples serve to indicate different ways in which scientific collaborations limit the 
description of meditative experience. In some cases, lived experience drops out of view 
altogether—even if the persona and abilities of the meditator do not. In others, it is 
circumscribed as a gateway to scientific explanation. Meanwhile, discursive approaches such as 
the one by Wooffitt & Holt draw attention to the performance of speech and silence about first-
person experience as a form of action within a specific interaction.   
 
--- 
The discussion in this section has provided a range of responses, from various kinds of literature, 
to the question of ‘What are the limits to putting meditative experience into words?’. We have seen that 
the verbal communication of meditative experiences and related states of consciousness is not 
unequivocally encouraged within Buddhist texts and their interpretation; that putting experience 
into words (and what vocabularies are chosen) is evaluated differently—and is a matter of 
ongoing adjustment—across places and times; and that there are multiple ways in which 
scientific settings produce limits to verbalizing experience. In the following two sections we 
bring these varied yet overlapping problematizations in conversation with ongoing work on the 
integration of first-person reports in contemplative neuroscience.  
 
4. Experience in Contemplative Neuroscience 
 
We turn now to, first, how experiences of meditation have been rendered within neuroscientific 
research and, second, how an expanded consideration of limits and absences could inform such 
research in the future. As we show in this section, in line with Varela’s (1996) 
neurophenomenology (section 2), contemplative neuroscience has begun to rely on participants’ 
experiential reports to make sense of brain activity during meditation. In so doing, it has started 
to address notable gaps in the dominant cognitive-neuroscientific paradigm, which typically 
adopts primarily a quantitative approach and does not include asking participants about their 
experiences in any depth. 
 
Most significantly for present purposes, the introduction of a neurophenomenological approach 
within contemplative neuroscience has provided a starting platform for addressing the 
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complexities of what is not said about experience—and, as we argue below, there is scope for 
enriching this approach further. 
 
We can distinguish three attitudes toward experience and self-reports in contemplative 
neuroscience. The first one characterizes the dominant paradigm, and typically involves 
measuring brain activity in participants engaged in a cognitive-behavioural task, without asking 
them anything about their experience (for recent examples of this approach, see Ahani et al., 
2014; Gard et al., 2015; Pasquini et al., 2015; Taren et al., 2015; Villemure et al., 2015). This 
attitude is in line with a long tradition in psychology and cognitive science that regards 
introspection and self-reports as unreliable and non-scientific. Interestingly, scientists working 
within this paradigm occasionally call for more attention to experience and self-reports—
although typically in a cautious and under-developed way, in the final paragraphs of scientific 
publications discussing ‘questions for the future’. For example, in their otherwise extensive 
review of the neuroscience of mindfulness meditation, Tang et al. (2015, p.222) briefly note that 
‘interpretations of study outcomes remain tentative until they are clearly linked to subjective 
reports’, but do not provide suggestions for how to realize this link.  
 
The second attitude characterizes what we call ‘thin’ neurophenomenological studies (see also 
Rappert et al., 2016). These studies aim to correlate brain activity with pre-established experiential 
categories. Experimenters here typically ask participants to enter into a specific meditative 
experiential state, and measure their brain activity while they are sustaining such state. For 
example, Lutz et al. (2004) asked participants with different levels of expertise (long-term 
Buddhist meditators and novices) to generate an experience of ‘pure compassion’, characterized 
as ‘unrestricted readiness and availability to help living beings’ (p. 16369), and compared brain 
activity during this task. This approach is ‘neurophenomenological’ because it relies on 
experience to make sense of neurophysiological data. Yet we characterize it as only ‘thinly’ 
neurophenomenological, because it does not involve asking participants to talk about their 
practice and experience; it just requires that they enter a certain pre-identified experiential state 
and at most rate their immersion in it, and signal when they are out of it. This approach can 
certainly be useful and productive. For example, Berman & Stevens (2015) recently adopted it to 
show that nondual states of awareness in meditators from different traditions correlate with the 
same pattern of EEG activity (see next section for more details; for another fruitful application 
of ‘thin’ neurphenomenology, see Lutz et al., 2002).  
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In addition, recently a few studies have adopted a third, more complex and complementary 
attitude toward participants’ experience, which we characterize as neurophenomenologically 
‘thick’. These studies employ qualitative methods from psychology and the social sciences to 
collect rich first-person data. In our view, they successfully integrate such methods with the 
quantitative ones of neuroscience, eventually identifying important specific categories of 
experience and their neural underpinnings. Thus consider the study conducted by Dor-Ziderman 
et al. (2013) on different states of self-awareness in long-term Vipassana meditators. Here, 
participants were asked to enter three different ‘self-related’ states, including a ‘selfless condition’ 
in which they had to try to be aware of the present moment without however experiencing 
themselves as subjects of experience. Importantly, in addition to adopting standard measures of 
self-reports involving Likert scales, the experimenters interviewed participants, asking them to 
describe their experience during the task ‘freely and in their own words, without reflection or 
judgment’ (p. 4). They found that, for the ‘selfless condition’, participants gave descriptions that 
could be grouped into three categories. Of these, one category (labelled ‘lack of ownership’) 
turned out to be associated with a distinct neural signature.9 A similar methodology characterizes 
Garrison et al.’s (2013) study. They also asked participants (long-term meditators, including some 
non-Buddhists) to describe their experience in their own words via open-ended questions. By 
using grounded theory (a widespread inductive qualitative approach in the social sciences that 
entails starting from participants’ accounts to build conceptual categories and theoretical 
schema), the experimenters were able to extrapolate several categories of experience, which they 
used to identify and interpret specific patterns of brain activity. These studies illustrate a ‘thicker’ 
neurophenomenological approach than the one described in the previous paragraph, because the 
experimenters collected relatively detailed verbal self-reports from participants to identify 
specific categories of experience, which they used in turn to interpret brain activity.  
 
In our view, these recent developments are particularly promising, because they open up a space 
in contemplative neuroscience where it becomes possible to (at least begin to) address the 
considerations regarding the ‘not said’ we highlighted in the previous section. For example, it 
becomes possible to ask participants about their attitude towards the tasks they are required to 
perform, about difficulties they might encounter when having to report their experiences, about 
their awareness of contextual constraints, and so on. In this way, questions pertaining to what 
cannot or should not be said about meditation, together with an enhanced sensitivity towards the 
participants’ background, tradition, and history of meditative training, can become part of the 
neuroscientific inquiry (see next section for more specific suggestions).  
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Promoters of the neurophenomenological approach themselves have paid little heed to this 
possibility. When limits have been identified and recognized as part of experimental research, the 
approach advocated has been one of rendering lived experience as explicit as possible. This 
orientation is apparent in the ‘explicitation interview’ developed by Vermersch, Petitmengin and 
others, including Varela (see Depraz et al., 2003; Petitmengin, 2006). In this interviewing method, 
the interviewer’s role is to keep redirecting the interviewee’s attention to her lived experience as 
it occurred in the past (immediate or remote), and to help her make explicit previously implicit or 
un-thematized aspects of such experience. This method requires the interviewer to ‘probe’ 
experience in as much depth as possible, gently soliciting the interviewee to relive a certain 
moment again and again, so that she may note aspects of the experience that were not apparent 
during initial rounds of self-observation and self-reporting. Promoters of this method have 
sometimes shown awareness of the difficulties associated with putting experience into words. 
Echoing some of the Buddhist themes given in the previous section, Petitmengin & Bitbol 
(2009, p. 389) note that ‘words … don’t display experience, they only point at it’ and warn that, 
in becoming absorbed in verbal descriptions, individuals may lose sight of their experience. And 
yet, this consideration has generally not led promoters of the explicitation interview to make the 
limits of verbal expression into an object of inquiry, or at least to recognize the need for caution 
about the possibility or advisability of trying to capture certain experiences through words; nor 
have these scholars treated what participants do not say about their experiences as potentially 
indicating an awareness of their awareness.10 Rather, they have strived for the development of 
ever more refined techniques of representation to help people become aware of otherwise 
implicit experiences, and to report on them in as much detail as possible. Arguably, then, this 
approach has given primacy to what can be verbalized (over what cannot) in other ways too, 
given that interviewing methods to extrapolate categories of experience invariably rely on what 
gets said, rather than on what is, can, or should not be said.  
 
5. Future Agendas for Contemplative Neuroscience 
 
How, then, might the theme of the ‘not said’ about meditative experiences inform future 
research in contemplative neuroscience? How can neuroscientific studies display a greater 
sensitivity to the issues we presented in section 3? We now offer some ideas, with the proviso 
that they are at this stage preliminary and would need to be refined in dialogue with experimental 
neuroscientists. Our main goal here is to stimulate further reflections on how to develop a thick 
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neurophenomenological approach to meditation that is sensitive to the limits of putting 
meditative experience into words, as discussed in contexts outside contemplative neuroscience.  
 
1. Attitudes. We saw in section 3 that there are different attitudes toward verbalizing meditative 
experiences, and we identified various reasons for this—from different philosophical 
assumptions about the relation between conceptual thought and lived experience, to practical 
and pedagogical concerns about how most effectively to learn/teach meditation, to sociocultural 
and scientific norms. As a first step, it would thus seem important to understand whether and 
how these different attitudes affect how participants relate to the task of recounting meditative 
experience in the experimental context. Differences in training and tradition, sociocultural 
background, assumptions about ‘Western science’, as well as interpersonal dynamics in the 
experimental setting may well influence the ability and willingness of meditators to talk about 
their experience, and how they eventually do so. Experimental research, we think, would have 
much to gain from explicitly acknowledging and addressing these possibilities and, accordingly, 
from taking participants’ practical and theoretical background into consideration, discussing with 
them their attitude toward talking about the experience of meditating, and using this information 
to design and refine experiments, or at least to decide how to analyse data. At the very minimum, 
it seems that contemplative-neuroscientific publications describing a neurophenomenological 
approach could at least mention some of these complexities. 
 
2. Ease/difficulty. Relatedly, it would also seem important to take into account how easy or 
difficult participants find it to talk about various aspects of their meditation practice and 
accompanying experiences. The invitation here is to resist the temptation to assume that all 
participants recognize and verbalize meditative experiences with the same degree of ease and 
confidence, and irrespective of the details of the experimental setup. It may be that reported 
ease/difficulty varies across participants depending on hours of practice, type of training and 
meditative tradition, philosophical assumptions, and nature of the experience under study. 
Additionally, and in line with the findings of Wooffitt & Holt (2011) mentioned earlier, the ease 
of recounting experience (and even the willingness to offer any report at all) may depend on the 
interactional dynamics of the experimental setup, including with whom participants are asked to 
interact in the course of a study (e.g., spiritual teacher, scientist, other). Our suggestion is that a 
neurophenomenologically thick contemplative neuroscience could show some sensitivity to these 
possibilities, and attempt to address them in the experimental context. A first step in this 
direction could involve identifying experiences that are reportedly easier to put into words than 
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others, and exploring whether there are distinctive neural differences between them and other 
experiences that are pointed to as harder to express. A further step could involve identifying the 
conditions that appear to make it easier for subjects to talk about their experiences.  
 
 3. Ineffability. Following immediately from the previous point, it would also be interesting to 
investigate experiences that participants report to be impossible (not just difficult) to put into 
words (i.e., experiences that appear to be ‘ineffable’). Experimenters could use qualitative 
phenomenological methods to explore these cases in some detail. Do participants find it 
impossible to talk about a certain experience because they feel they lack the appropriate 
vocabulary? Or is it the case that nothing can be said about a certain experience because of its 
nondual, objectless nature—as with states of ‘pure, contentless awareness … completely devoid 
of all determinate phenomenological contents’ (Shear, 1994, p. 320)? Are there, in other words, 
different experiences of ‘ineffability’ and, if so, can they be identified? And do different 
experiences of ineffability, if any, correlate with distinctive patterns of neurophysiological 
activity?  
 
One could also carry out a neurophenomenological investigation into the phases leading up to, 
and/or following from, experiences identified as ineffable. What happens in experience before 
and/or after an experience that cannot be put into words? And what happens at the 
neurophysiological level? To illustrate this idea more concretely, consider the ‘thin’ study by 
Berman & Stevens (2015), briefly mentioned in the previous section. The experimenters here 
looked at the EEG neural signatures of nondual states of awareness, defined as ‘absent of 
phenomenological content, characterized by pure awareness … and a dissipation of any sense of 
separateness between self and other’ (p. 2). They asked participants trained in different 
contemplative traditions and practices (Vipassana, Transcendental Meditation, visualization, and 
others) to engage in meditation after being instructed as follows: ‘If at any point during your 
meditation you become aware that you have transitioned from a state of non-thought (or 
transcendence, mental silence, or nonduality), back into a state of thought, please indicate this by 
winking your left eye, as long as you can do so without disruption of your meditation’ (p. 5). 
Results showed that, irrespective of meditative technique, self-indicated states of nondual 
awareness correlated with a distinctive EEG signature. This interesting study, we suggest, could 
be productively complemented by a phenomenologically ‘thicker’ investigation of the temporal 
structure of participants’ meditation practice, and by using participants’ reports to interpret brain 
activity. For example, one could ask meditators whether they prepare for a state of nondual 
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awareness and, if so, how (e.g., do they actively seek to achieve it? Or do they let it ‘come’ by 
adopting a more passive, receptive attitude?). One could also explore the moment the meditators 
note that the state of nondual awareness has dissipated, and inquire into what happens at the 
physiological level when this noting occurs. Is it possible to identify a neural ‘transition pattern’ 
between nondual and dual awareness? If so, can experience be probed further to identify 
something in it corresponding to this neural transition—perhaps by using here techniques 
borrowed from the ‘explicitation interview’ mentioned in the previous section?
11
 (See Jo et al., 
2014 for a recent application of an iterative method that used self-reports and neural measures to 
generate further hypotheses about the relationship between experience and brain activity).  
 
4. Meta-awareness. Over time, meditating is said to change people’s awareness not just of the 
world, but also of oneself and of one’s awareness of self and world (i.e., meditation is said to 
enhance meta-awareness). These changes are likely to come with an increased awareness also of 
the limits of one’s capacities to conceptualize and/or talk about one’s experiences. A further 
possibility for a neurophenomenologically thicker approach to meditation, then, could involve 
conducting longitudinal studies to explore such changes in meta-awareness (if any), including 
changes in one’s awareness of the difficulties and limitations of putting experience into words (if 
any). Here, qualitative and phenomenological investigations could be used to explore possible 
changes, over time, in participants’ meta-awareness; data obtained in this way could then be used 
to interpret brain activity, aiming to understand whether possible changes in meta-awareness are 
underpinned by specific changes in brain activity. Data about brain activity could in turn be used 
as an additional source of information for both experimenters and participants, perhaps to 
indicate whether and how experiential reports could be further refined.   
 
5. Ability to report. Neurophenomenological approaches to meditation often assume that expert 
meditators are able to provide more accurate and fine-grained accounts of their experiences than 
non-meditators or novices (e.g., Lutz et al., 2007; Jo et al., 2014). We think that this contention 
would benefit from a thick neurophenomenological investigation, as it makes a number of 
assumptions about expert meditators’ linguistic-representational capacities. One way to test the 
assumption that accuracy increases with practice could involve measuring physiological activity 
in non-meditators, novices and expert meditators, and asking them to report their bodily 
sensations in real-time, to check whether expert meditators are indeed more accurate than other 
participants in describing bodily sensations.12 As part of this investigation, one could ask whether 
there are traditions that encourage talking about the experience of meditation more than others, 
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and whether these differences affect meditators’ ability to put their experiences into words, as 
well as their meta-awareness. Also, one could investigate whether any differences in the capacity 
to describe experience also come with differences in brain activity. This research might make it 
possible to classify meditators on the basis of not just how many hours of practice they have 
(currently the standard criteria in contemplative neuroscience), but also of their ability to talk 
about their experience, including their awareness of the difficulties and limitations of doing so. 
 
These, then, are some possibilities for engaging contemplative neuroscience with existing 
discussions about experience and its verbalization. In offering novel possibilities for 
experimentation that take as their topic the contingencies and limits of accounts, our agendas 
aim to promote ways in which self-reports and bodily measures can be put in conversation with 
one another along the lines advocated in section 2. 
  
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
As a contribution to the current mix of both curiosity and caution that characterizes the 
scientific study of meditation, we have aimed to advance a set of possibilities for future research. 
We situated current experimental methodological challenges against tensions associated with 
recounting experiences that feature in writings on meditation in a variety of genres. The limits of 
verbalizing experiences of meditation have been prominently discussed in Buddhist doctrine, 
first-person accounts of meditative journeys, and social and cultural analyses of meditation and 
research experimentation. In highlighting some of the ways authors grapple with what is not put 
into words about experiences of meditation, we sought to show how these allied bodies of 
writing can be a creative resource for contemplative neuroscience.  
 
To date, considerations regarding what can, should, and is not said about experience have not 
significantly informed contemplative neuroscience research—in large part because of the ways in 
which neuroscience in general disregards first-person accounts of experience. Yet, we have 
argued, recent developments of the neurophenomenological approach are paving the way for a 
contemplative neuroscience that can engage those tensions and questions, generating new 
possibilities for accommodating first-person perspectives in its wake.  
 
Centred on ways of working with absence, the type of engagements we have started to signpost in 
this article could be mutually enriching. Contemplative neuroscience offers the potential to 
render longstanding debates and questions about spiritual doctrine and subjective experience 
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into empirical topics for investigation. Likewise, a contemplative neuroscience informed by the 
wide-ranging and extended discussion about what cannot be said about experience offers 
additional agendas for research. This holds the potential not just to open up new topics for 
experimentation, but also for the transformation of what forms of science are possible that 
Varela (1996) hoped for through the development of neurophenomenology. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 As one anonymous referee rightly pointed out, these calls for integrating first- and third-person 
data face various challenges. A particularly difficult one is posed by the long-standing divide 
between quantitative and qualitative methods, which come with different and seemingly 
incompatible philosophical and epistemological assumptions. Notably, whereas neuroscientists 
often rely on some forms of naïve realism (e.g. in relation to the representational abilities of 
language), social scientists typically endorse a social constructivist framework. We think that, in 
spite of these undeniable differences and the need for caution when engaging in interdisciplinary 
research, it is possible to integrate different methods to study conscious experience in a 
productive way. We say more about this in section 4, where we illustrate neuroscientific studies 
that, in our view, successfully integrate qualitative and quantitative methods.      
2 Thanks to Jonathan Shear for this point.  
3 Also, see Sharf (2000) for a refutation of the premises underlying this type of specification. 
4 Thanks to John Whalen-Bridge for this point.  
5 This observation is not unique to Tibetan Buddhism in recent times. Buddhism has a long 
history of modifying teachings and practices to facilitate its spread and survival—spurring 
concomitant changes to the role and significance of meditation (Shedneck, 2015, chapter 6). 
Consider for example also the politico-religious significance of Burma’s mass lay meditation 
movement that came to prominence in the mid-twentieth century (Jordt, 2007). 
6 Whereas this section continues to focus on Buddhist meditation in particular, of course not all 
meditation subjects are religiously affiliated. For an analysis of how the secular mindfulness 
movement enables new ways of bringing experience within the remit of scientific forms of 
thinking and analysis, see Walach (2014ab).   
7 Ricard’s accounts can also be contrasted with those that discuss meditative experience through 
Buddhist terminology, as in Lopez Jr. (2008, chapter 5); see also the approach advocated by 
Schmidt (2014). 
8 On a related note, discussions of the dissemination and uptake of Buddhist-inspired meditation 
by Western practitioners often point to the erasure of religious (ritual and soteriological) and 
cultural meanings in the process (Andresen, 2000; Lopez Jr., 2008; Faure, 2012). Critics have 
argued that what the West has received is a narrow notion of meditation that is anthropologically 
and historically inaccurate: meditation in Asian Buddhist societies tends to be both less 
widespread and closer to devotional practices than its Western projection would have one 
believe (Lopez Jr., 2008; Faure, 2012).  
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9 This experiment is similar to the one conducted by Lutz et al. (2002), who investigated 
participants’ visual perception of ‘magic eye pictures’ (autostereograms). Here, too, the 
experimenters asked participants to describe their experience in their own words, and were 
accordingly able to identify categories of experience that enabled them to make sense of patterns 
of brain activity that would otherwise have appeared as mere noise.  
10 A similar tendency can be found in Thompson (2015), who examines several yogic accounts of 
consciousness, and maps them onto recent neuroscientific findings. Even when he discusses 
conscious states traditionally characterized as objectless and non-conceptual, he does not make 
reference to what is or may not be talked about these states, and it is not clear whether he thinks 
that there are experiential states that do not lend themselves easily (if at all) to 
neurophenomenological investigation because of their objectless and non-conceptual nature, 
and/or because of social conventions about disclosure. 
11 For example, one could use specific ‘deepening techniques’ involving ‘Ericksonian language’—
see Petitmentin (2006, p. 250).  
12 Interestingly, a study by Sze et al. (2010) found that reported visceral awareness in meditators 
did not correlate with actual cardiac activity. The authors attributed this result to the inadequacy 
of their self-report inventory for bodily awareness, which did not inquire about real-time bodily 
sensations but only asked participants about their bodily functioning more generally. A thick 
neurophenomenological study addressing this topic would ask participants to describe their 
bodily sensations as they occur (or immediately after), and compare these reports with 
measurements of related bodily activity.  
